“The mountains you dreamed of are covered in snow.” This Turkish proverb refers to a circumstance in which a long-held dream or wish has finally come true, yet it is accompanied by unforeseen difficulties, dangers, or setbacks. After the 50-year-old Assad dictatorship was overthrown by Syrian revolutionary forces, this appears to be the situation facing Turkey. On the one hand, the events earlier this month likely exceeded Ankara’s “wildest dreams” in terms of bringing about regime change in Damascus, reducing the influence of Russia and Iran, reducing the “Kurdish threat” at its borders, and permitting the large-scale repatriation of Syrian refugees.
Turkey and the Kurdish question post-Assad
However, things could move in a different direction. First, although Turkey influences the upcoming power shift in Syria due to its backing of the Syrian National Army and ties to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the difficulty lies in making sure that everything fits together without experiencing significant losses. Second, the role of Ankara’s rivals, particularly pro-Kurdish organizations like the Syrian Democratic Forces and the U.S.-backed People’s Protection Units, remains uncertain given the uncertainties surrounding the incoming Trump government. It appears that Turkey’s leadership is happy with the most recent developments. However, given that its regional equation calls for both the fight against the “Kurdish terrorist corridor” and the facilitation of a peaceful sociopolitical change in Damascus, it is very possible that this evolutionary phase will have a big impact on Turkey’s Kurdish equation. The degree to which Turkey’s goals on the matter coincide with those of the Syrian transition administration under Mohammed al Sharraa is still unclear. “If they [the Syrian transition cabinet] address this issue properly, there would be no reason for us to intervene,” the Turkish Foreign Ministry recently stated. Although this appears to support their acceptance of a pluralistic vision for a “new” Syria, disagreements may arise over their differing views on the future of pro-Kurdish organizations in the northeast.
Assad’s fall and Kurdish tensions in Turkey
Ankara must choose between pursuing normalization to reduce instability in the area and running the risk of escalation in Syria, which would rekindle the securitized strategy it has traditionally used to address the Kurdish issue. The Kurdish question looms large and is likely to remain an unresolved equation at the center of Turkey’s domestic and regional calculations because there is no clear roadmap and Syria’s position is changing. The Kurdish question in Turkey has historically been likened to a Pandora’s box, which can be opened, shattered, or concealed at different times by many actors for various reasons. Turkish residents and political watchers are used to the government’s relationship with the Kurds going through cycles of tension and rapprochement. However, when the Turkish government issued a fresh offer for normalization to different Kurdish leadership groups in October, many were taken aback. Devlet Bahçeli, the head of the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party, made it unexpected.
Reopening Turkey’s Kurdish dilemma
The fact that it was directed specifically at the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which is regarded as a terrorist group by the US, Turkey, and many Western nations, as well as its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, who has been detained by Turkey since 1999, made it much more startling. Unexpectedly, that same month, some Kurdistan Workers’ Party cells carried out a terrorist attack in Ankara. In response, the Turkish government increased military operations and re-securitized opposition and pro-Kurdish political figures. “A Turk is not a Turk if he dislikes Kurds.” A Kurd is not a Kurd if they dislike Turks. The head of the right-wing Nationalist Movement Party in Turkey declared as much. Given Bahçeli’s well-known anti-Kurdish views, this was an unexpected source. A few days later, Erdoğan’s public remarks echoed the same appeasement words in a similarly conciliatory tone, although they were less forceful and more circumspect in their distinction between “Kurdish brothers” and “those terrorists in Syria and Iraq.” This appears to support our earlier argument that the Turkish state’s interaction with Kurdish political and military representatives is marked by a blending of internal and external factors.
What Assad’s fall means for Turkey’s Kurds
But with the “not super Turkey-friendly” initial appointments of the incoming Trump administration, this cautiously optimistic mood soured. The appointment of Mike Waltz as national security advisor and Marco Rubio as secretary of state are two individuals who may make things more difficult between Ankara and Washington. The former is well-known for his affiliations with the Gülenists, who are supporters of Fethullah Gülen, who is thought to have been the mastermind of the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey but passed away lately. A lot also depends on what happens on a global scale. Even though powerful nations like the US and Russia may have shifted their focus to other, more pressing situations, their actions and sway still can limit or increase the flexibility of other regional actors.
Recent Comments