The prospect of Trump’s second term has revived debates on his global impact, especially on trade, defense, immigration, and geopolitics.

As a South Asian country with a key location, Bangladesh must carefully consider these changes and manage its bilateral relationship with the US proactively. Under the “America First” concept, Trump’s first term (2017–2021) instituted a “transactional” style to diplomacy; yet, his possible return could worsen current issues and open up new avenues for Dhaka.

With more than 80% of exports to the US coming from the ready-made garment (RMG) industry, the US is Bangladesh’s top export destination. Bangladesh sold $10.41 billion worth of goods to the United States in 2022, highlighting the need to preserve positive economic relations. This dynamic might be complicated, though, by Trump’s protectionist rhetoric and possible calls for more stringent adherence to labor laws or supply chain transparency.

Is Bangladesh’s economy in danger with Trump’s presence?

Trump prioritized bilateral accords over multilateral ones throughout his first term, frequently using trade relations as leverage for larger political objectives. Bangladesh, whose economy depends on access to international markets and advantageous trade agreements, may suffer greatly from this strategy. Under a second Trump administration, the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) initiative for Bangladesh, which was halted in 2013, may experience additional delays.

Bangladesh needs to expand its export markets outside its usual partners, especially in North America and Europe. It’s also critical to increase adherence to global labor and environmental norms. Redoubled efforts are required to improve worker rights and safety, which were started following the Rana Plaza accident. In a time when the dynamics of international commerce are changing, Dhaka should also actively pursue economic diplomacy, positioning itself as a dependable and steady partner.

Impact of US-China conflict on Bangladesh

Bangladesh is at the center of the escalating US-China conflict due to its location along the Bay of Bengal. A key component of Trump’s foreign policy during his first term was his Indo-Pacific Strategy, which sought to use regional ties and alliances to offset China’s expanding power. Bangladesh engages in regional security initiatives and discussions with the United States, despite its strong economic links to China.

Militarization of the Indo-Pacific region could increase under a more muscular Trump administration, forcing Bangladesh to make tough decisions. Bangladesh must weigh its reliance on Chinese investment in technology and infrastructure against the US’s inevitable drive for tighter defense cooperation under the pretense of countering Chinese influence. Washington has previously questioned the nation’s participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which makes this delicate balancing job much more difficult.

Bangladesh should put its strategic independence first and avoid getting sucked into the US-China rivalry. By supporting a multipolar Indo-Pacific, Dhaka may establish itself as a state that promotes peace and is impartial. Furthermore, focused economic and military collaboration with the US, especially in fields like counterterrorism and marine security, might improve bilateral relations without offending China.

Examining Bangladesh’s major issues

The Rohingya problem is one of Bangladesh’s most urgent humanitarian issues. The nation, which is home to more than a million Rohingya refugees from Myanmar, is under tremendous social, economic, and environmental strain. Limited involvement in humanitarian situations characterized Trump’s first term, and he may further distance himself from global endeavors during his second term.

Responses to Bangladesh’s requests for foreign assistance, especially for the repatriation of Rohingya, have been conflicting. Even while the US has contributed a substantial amount of money, it has not taken the initiative to address the crisis’s underlying causes. Trump’s mistrust of global organizations like the UN may make it more difficult to hold Myanmar responsible for its conduct, which would limit Bangladesh’s options.

A multifaceted approach is required from Bangladesh to guarantee sustained support. To keep the Rohingya issue on Washington’s agenda, this entails interacting with US lawmakers, advocacy organizations, and think tanks.

At the same time, Dhaka ought to look into joint ventures with other nations and organizations to form an international alliance supporting a long-term solution. Because of its strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific, the US may also be interested in highlighting the implications of extended refugee displacement for regional security.

Trump’s statements toward Bangladesh during his first term were sometimes impacted by lobbying and domestic political factors. In addition to straining bilateral ties, remarks that seemed contemptuous of Bangladesh’s achievements and contributions also served to perpetuate unfavorable preconceptions. 

Furthermore, despite its critical role in cultural and economic interactions, the Bangladeshi diaspora in the US is still underutilized in refuting these narratives. Engaging the Bangladeshi diaspora through academic partnerships, commercial forums, and cultural festivals may foster goodwill and a positive narrative.